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The following is the minute of the last meeting with Robert on 17th April at Hertie. Everyone was present at the meeting and has actively participated. The issues addressed in the meeting were: the key questions leading the narrative of our presentation and feedback on the PPT presented in class one week ago.
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DGAP associate fellow Jacopo Maria Pepe spoke to Politico’s Matthew Karnitschnig about other aspects of Chinese investments in the Western Balkans. Winning better access to EU markets, he suggests, is only part of the story.
China likely intends not just to send cargo to Europe, but from it as well, said Pepe, who has studied China’s involvement in the region.
Beijing’s longer-term aim may be to build its own industrial manufacturing base to serve not only European markets, but also “new emerging markets along the Eurasian rim stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Middle East and further to India,” he concluded in a lengthy study for the Edwin Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at Johns Hopkins University, published earlier this year.
Interesting article linked to this work: https://dgap.org/en/think-tank/publications/dgapanalyse/chinas-inroads-central-eastern-and-south-eastern-europe
Summary:
China has considerably increased its engagement in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe in recent years. The creation of the “16+1 Cooperation Framework” in 2012 aroused concerns in Europe that China is pursuing a divisive strategy. Beijing’s primary goal, however, is to use the region as a gateway to Western Europe’s markets while including the EU in its own Eurasian integration project; this suggests that a strong regulatory EU is actually preferable from the Chinese perspective. Beijing’s deepening involvement in the region could nevertheless increase economic divergencies within the EU as whole – particularly in light of an emerging trade triangle involving China, Germany, and the Visegrad countries that potentially excludes countries in Atlantic and southern Europe and puts the “German-Central European manufacturing core” at an advantage. Germany should address this risk by developing a triple-edged strategy that carefully balances national interest, European cohesion, and engagement with China. This includes, first, working with the Visegrad Four, with other European countries, and with EU institutions to forge a deeper and more effective cooperation with China to enhance transport connectivity and economic, modernization, particularly in the Western and Eastern Balkans. Second, Germany should increase pressure on China within the framework of the planned EU-China investment agreement for opening up the Chinese domestic market to ensure mutual access. And third, it should promote forward-looking European industrial policy centered on the digitalization of industry, value, and supply chains for Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe. This would allow Germany to prevent intra-European divisions from deepening, while taking advantage of its triangular relations with China and the countries of Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe, and fostering mutually advantageous integration across Eurasia.
China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative as an
Incentive for Intergovernmental Cooperation
and Reforms at Central Asia’s Borders
Contact Information: Dr. Sebastian Schiek
Research Division: Eastern Europe, Eurasia
Associate
sebastian.schiek(at)swp-berlin.org
phone:+49 30 88007-331
Through the BRI: The country (China) aims to use it to bolster both
its international legitimacy and its geopolitical power.
Europe’s view of the initiative is ambivalent. On one
hand, it promises a certain added value, for example
investment in European infrastructure, on the other
hand, China and the European states were unable to
resolve their disagreements at the Forum. China was
not prepared to include principles demanded by the
Europeans in the final communiqué, in particular
guarantees of free trade and fair competition, transparency and social and environmental sustainability.
For this reason, European states, including Germany,
France and the UK, refused to sign the final text.
Central Asian governments, on the other hand,
have a less ambivalent attitude to the Chinese Initiative. The presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan took part in the Forum and signed the
communiqué. This was because of the great importance China now has in Central Asia, but also their
strong desire to profit from the New Silk Road
jbenne92 is discussing. 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative: 21st Century Silk Road 
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